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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
VERN SHUTTE & SONS
Pl.aintiff and Respondent
VS.

Case No.

J. R. BROADBENT AND
EARL FREDRICKSON
Defendants and Appellants

11937

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for the balance due upon an account
for chopping hay at Hazleton, Idaho, a small town by
Burley, Idaho.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried in the District Court before the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson. Judgment was granted in
favor of the plaintiff and against both of the defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and Respondent requests the court to affirm
the Judgment of the Lower Court.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, J. R. Broadbent o\vned cattle which he
was feeding at Hazleton, Idaho. J. R. Broadbent owned all
of the cattle in the feed lot of Carl Nelson and Von Kincaid
and they were the only cattle in the feed lots and were in
Broadbent's possession. (R. 68, 69, 89, 90, 102) Plaintiff
was called by Carl Nelson and asked to chop hay for the
Broadbent cattle that were in his yard. (R. 75) Plaintiff
went to Carl Nelson's place also called Steele Ranch and
started chopping the hay. For the first few days, plain·
tiff did not ask whose cattle they were, but he was told
by Carl Nelson or Von Kincaid that they were J. R. Broad·
bent's cattle. (R. 60, 65, 66) The information that the
people had in Idaho was that they were Broadbent's cattle
and that Earl Fredrickson was in charge of them. No one
was told of the details of any deal between Broadbent and
Fredrickson. Plaintiff testified,
"Yes, I heard that, and I heard he was working for
Broadbent and it was a joint deal, so I don't know.
We just did the chopping. I didn't discuss that pa11
with Mr. Fredrickson." (R. 58)
When there was approximately $1,000.00 due plaintiff
Vern Shutte asked Earl Fredrickson for his money. He
received a check in the sum of $1,000.00. Thereafter he
chopped hay which amounted to $1,035.05, for wh'icI1 he
was not paid. Thereafter, J. R. Broadbent came to Idaho
and there was a change in who was handling
cattle from Earl Fredrickson to Blaine Hoffman. (R. lOt
]nintiff
105, 106). After he took charge of the catt1e, th e P ,.
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went on chopping hay and after that he was paid for the
chopping which he did .

•

Prior to the time the cattle were moved and while
they were subject to a lien, the plaintiff called J. R. Broadbent and made demand on him for the money, and told
him that he had to be paid the balance due of $1,035.05.
J. R. Broadbent told him to send a bill to Box 1522 El
'
Centro, California, which he sent by certified mail and
which was refused. (Exhibit IP, R. 55-56) In the latter
part of May, the cattle were moved from the yards at
Steele Ranch to Wyoming where they were to be summered.
All of the hay that was chopped by plaintiff was fed to
J. R. Broadbent's cattle (R. 69 and 75).
Mr. Broadbent's version of the deal was that Mr.
Fredrickson was to acquire feed location and take care
of all the exepnses of his cattle and that he was to be reimtursed at 15¢ per pound on the gain on the cattle during
the time he had them in his possession. (R. 77, 78)
Earl Fredrickson's version of the deal for feeding the
cattle was that J. R. Broadbent would furnish the cattle
and Fredrickson would feed the cattle on a gain basis and
Broadbent would advance 15¢ per head per day once a
month for the expenses of the feed lot opemtion and for the
difference between the weigh in and the out weight, he
would be paid 15¢ per pound on the gain. (R. 77, 78, 84, 85,
111, 112)

No written contract was entered into between Earl
Fredrickson and J. R. Broadbent, but after Fredrickson
was no longer in charge of the cattle, (R. 84) there was a
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written contract drawn up by attorney Oman and it was
signed by the parties. Earl Fredrickson testified that it
was not the entire contract between the parties and he had
conveyed certain property to J. R. Broadbent, and in con.
sideration thereof, Broadbent was to pay all the bills that
had been incurred in the feeding of the cattle. (R. 72, 74,
87, 88, 113) Fredrickson was to get his share of the gain
on the cattle. That J. R. Broadbent paid bills incurred by
Fredrickson to Gary Easton (R. 104, 105, 106) and to Carl
Nelson and George Burton, (R. 88, 90), and Blaine Hoff.
man told Fredrickson Mr. Broadbent would see that all
these bills were taken care of. (R. 107)
Mr. Fredrickson's version of the hiring of Mr. Shutte
is as follows:
"Q. Mr. Fredrickson, you are the one that originally
got Mr. Shutte to chop the hay?

A. Yes, through Mr. Nelson.
Q. And the price of the hay was $3.50 a ton?

A. That is right, correct.
Q. And that would be the reasonable value
ping of the hay there in Burley there a
time?

a

A. Yes, that was a fair price."
It is apparent that the defendants were in a joint ven·

ture, both trying· to make a profit from the operation.
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ARGUMENT
There was a joint venture. The defendants held themselves out as joint adventurers. Broadbent owned the cattle
and they were always in his possession, but he let Earl
Fredrickson have control of all the cattle and the entire
operation. People who furnished the feed and who chopped
the feed did not know the exact deal, but they were led to
believe that the owner of the cattle would pay their bill.
Plaintiff is entitled to compensa'tion for chopping of the
hay because it conferred a benefit on Broadbent's cattle
and Broadbent is liable under any of the following four
theories:
(1) That is was a joint enterprise between the two
defendants, Broadbent and Fredrickson.
(2) There was an agency. Broadbent made Fredrickson his general agent and there is an implied agency between J. R. Broadbent and Earl Fredrickson in any event.
(3) That Broadbent, by his acts, and allowing others
to furnish feed to his cattle was estopped to deny the agent's
authority.
(4) Unjust enrichment - J. R. Broadbent is liable
because he got the benefit from having the chopped hay
and would be unjustly enriched if he is not required to
pay for it.
JOINT VENTURE
As to third person who deals with a joint adventurer in
good faith and without knowledge of any limitations upon
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his authority, the law presumes him to have been given
power to bind his associates by such contracts as is reasonably necessary to carry out his business.
JOINT VENTURE
The rights and liabilities as to third persons' liability
is set out in 46 Am. Jur. 2nd, page 76, Section 57, and we
quote from page 16 as follows:
"57. Generally. It has already been pointed out
that the rights, duties and liabilities of joint venturers are governed, in general, by rules which are
similar or analogous to those which govern the cor· '
responding rights, duties, and liabilities of partners,
except as they are limited by the fact that the scope
of a joint venture is narrower than that of the
ordinary partnership. As in the case of partners,
joint venturers may be jointly and severally liable to
third parties for the debts of the venture. Thus,
a joint venturer whose name does not appear on a
note can be held liable thereon where the note was
signed by his coventurer in the name of the joint
venture.

The liability of one engaged in a joint enter·
prise, for the acts of his associates, is founded on '
principles of agency. In accordance with the general
rule that each member of a joint venture acts as
both principal and agent of his coventurers as to
those things done within the apparent scope of the
venture and for its benefit, it is held that each of
several joint venturers has power to bind the
and to subject them to liability to third persons ID
matters which are strictly within the scope of .th.e
joint enterprise. As stated, in the ahsence of a
111
tation of authority imposed by the participants
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a joint venture, a member can bind his associates
whether disclosed or undisclosed, by such
as are reasonably necessary to carry on the venture.
The rule is that as to third persons who deal with a
joint venturer in good faith and without knowledge
of any limitations upon his authority, the law presumes him to have been given power to bind his
associates by such contracts as are reasonably necessary to carry on the business in which the joint
venturers are engaged, and they become liable on
such contracts, notwithstanding that they may have
expressly agreed among themselves that they should
not be liable. Even in jurisdictions where the power
of a joint venturer to bind his associates by contracts with third persons relating to the venture is
considered to be less full than that of an ordinary
partner, it is recognized that one joint venturer may
bind the others in matters respecting which he has
been given express of apparent authority."
To the same effect is the citation in 33 C.J., page 871,
section 99 as follows:
"99. A. Liabilities to Third Persons - 1. Simple
contracts - a. By individual Members. As to third
persons who deal with a joint adventurer in good
faith and without knowledge of any limitation upon
his authority, the law presumes him to have been
given power to bind his associates by such contracts
as are reasonably necessary to carry on the business
in which the joint adventurers are engaged, and
they become liable upon suoh contracts, nQltwithstanding they may have expressly agreed amongst
themselves that they should not be liable."
In 48 C. J. S. Section 15, page 871, it states:
"15.-Rights against third Persons. T?e
of a member of a joint adventure to bmd his asso-
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ciates
. so as to affect the rights of such associ· t
agamst third persons has been held to be governed
generally by the law applicable to partnerships."
Also, there is a citation in 33 C. J., under Section 16 on
page 846, top of column 2, in which it says:
"the acquisition and performance of contracts for
municipal or government works, the carrying on of
building operations, the purchase and management
of vessels or animals." 85
In headnote 85 they cite the following cases:
"85. Rice v. Peter.s, 128 App. Div. 778, 113 NYS
40 (rev. 58 Misc. 385, 111 NYS 5) (joint adventure
for the buying and selling of horses: Peterson v.
Nichols 90 Wash., 398, 156 P. 406 (ownership and
management of stallion)."
We submit that in this case there was created as far as
third parties are concerned a joint adventure.
At 48 C. J. S. Section 2, page 813, we quote:
" ( b) Particular transactions. Whether the parties
to a particular contract have thereby created, as
between themselves, the relation of joint
turers depends on their intention. * * * As to thll'd
persons the legal, and not the actual, intention con·
trols." 93
Note 93 cites the following cases:
"93. U.S. - Corpus Juris cited in Aiken Mills v.
U.S., D.C.S.C. 53 F. Supp. 524, 526, affirmed, C.C.A..
144 F2nd 23 Cal - Snavely v Walls, 57 P.2d 161.
13 Cal. App. 2d 600."
That one of the above cited cases is the case of Snavely
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57 P.2d 161, 13 Cal. App. 2d 600, and the head
notes are as follows:

t'. Walls,

'.' l. Joint Adventures. Key 1. Whether relationship

that of ?ebtor and creditor or one of joint liability
determrned, as between parties, from letter of
contract and conduct of parties thereunder but
where rights of third parties are involved,
rnental question is what third parties had right to
believe from language of contract and conduct of
parties as it affected them.
is

2. Joint Adventures. Key 1. Evidence held sufficient to support judgment against two defendants
for balance due on open book account for lumber
sold defendants on ground that defendants were
engaged in joint venture."
We further quote from 48 C.J.S. at page 813, top of
column 2, note 93:
"In applying the rules discussed in the preceding
subdivision of this section, particular transactions
which have been held to constitute joint adventures
include agreements providing that the parties thereto
shall contri:bute money to be used in the purchase of
lands to be sold for their mutual benefit in equal or
specified proportions, or that one or more shall contribute money and the other or others special knowledge, experience, or judgment, as in the purchase,
and development of lands; the organization, acquisition, consolidation, or development of corporation;
the buying and selling of corporate stocks; the making, acquisition, or transfer of contracts for ispecified purposes the acquisitions and performance of
contracts for municipal of government works; the
construction of buildings or the carrying on of building operations; the purchase and management of
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vessels ,the purchase, management, or sale of an1·•
mals." 7
Note 7 cites the following cases:
"7. Iowa-Johanik v. Des Moines Drug Co., 17
N. W. 2d, 385 Mont. - Snyder v. Carmichael, 58
P.2d 1004, 102 Mont. 387. N.Y. - Titus v. Empire
Mink Corporation, 17 N.Y.S.2nd 909. Or. - Mid
Columbia Production Credit Ass'n v. Smeed, 136
P.2d 255, 171 Or. 140.
33 C.J. p. 846 note 85."
There are sub-heads under these cases on bulls, horses,
mules and stallions.
In the case of Priestley v. Peterson, 145 P.2nd, 253,
19 Wash. 2nd 820, on page 264 of the Pacific, bottom of
second column, headnote 11, 12 is as follows:
(11, 12) In 33 C.J. p. 871 Sec. 99, appears the fol·
lowing text: "As to third persons who deal with a
joint adventurer in good faith and without know!·
edge of any limitations upon his authority, the law
presumes him to have been given power to bind his
associates by such contracts as are reasonably nee·
essary to carry on the business in which the joint
adventurers are engaged, and they become liable
upon such contracts, notwithstanding they may have
expressly agreed amongst themselves that they
should not be liable. * * *
AGENCY
IMPLIED OR BY ESTOPPEL
J. R. Broadbent was the owner of the cattle and had
control of them at all times and J. R. Broadbent placed
Earl Fredrickson in possession of the cattle.
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Under such circumstances ,there is an implied agency
or agency by estoppel. We quote from 2 C.J., page 440,
Section 36 as follows:
" ( 5) From Active Holding Out. An agency may
be implied where one person by his conduct holds
out another as his agent, or thereby invests him
with apparent or ostensible authority as agent; and
he thereby becomes liable for such agent's acts,
whether the liability is based upon an implied agency
or an agency by estoppel, and whether he actually
intends to be bound or not."
At 2 C.J.S., Section 23, page 1045, Implied Agency,
top of second column, we quote:
"The relation of agency need not depend upon express appointment and acceptance thereof, but may
be, and frequently is, implied from the words and
conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the
particular case. If, from the facts and circumstances
of the particular case, it appears that there was at
least an implied intention to create it, the relation
may be held to exist, notwithstanding a denial by
the alleged principal, and whether or not the parties
understood it to be an agency."
At 2 C.J.S. page 1046, Section 23, 2nd column, 2nd
paragraph:
"In the notes below will be found instances of facts

from which, when considered with all attending
circumstances, it has been held that an agency may
be implied." 78
Under note 78 is the following:
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Possesion of personalty
'.'Agency
be implied from the fact that one
placed m possession of personal pro}lerty belong.
mg to another. - Beers v. McNaught, 162 N.Y.S.
514, 175 App. Div. 643 - Bertrand v. Hunt 154
P. 804, 89 Wash. 475; 2 C.J. p. 439 note 96."'
J. R. Broadbent as principal is estopped to deny Fredrickson was his agent. A general statement of this rule is
found at 3 Am. Jur.2nd, Section 76, page 479, which we
quote as follows:
"76. Estoppel of principal to deny agent's authority.
Although the general statements of the doctrine of
apparent authority do not include all the element\
of an estoppel in pais, or equitable estoppel, the
prerequisites for the application of the doctrine to
bind the principal are such that there is no practical
difference in effect between them in such respect;
and, as applied by the courts, the doctrine of apparent authority is neither broader than nor essentially
dissimilar to the estoppel of the principal to deny
the agent's authority. S'ta!ted in terms of estoppel,
the rule is that where a principal has, by his volun·
tary act, placed an agent in such a situation that
a person of ordinary prudence conversant with busi·
ness usages and the nature of the particular business
is justified in assuming that such agent has au·
thority to perform a particular act and deals wit.h
the agent upon that assumption, the principal. If
estopped as against such third person from denying
the agent's authority; he will not be permitted to
prove that the agent's authority was, in fact, less
extensive than that with which he was apparently
clothed."
Under note 18 they quote the Utah case of Harrison

1
·
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,1uto Securities Co., 257 P. 677, 70 U. 11, and we quote
from the Pacific at page 677, headnote 3 and 4.
"3. Principal and agent, Key 99 - Principal is
bound by agent's acts within apparent scope of authority, as against third parties dealing with agent
in good faith. * * *
4. Estoppel Key 72 - Where one of two innocent
parties must suffer, loss should fall on him who
made third party's wrongful act possible."
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
J. R. Broadbent had the cattle delivered to Steele Ranch
owned by Carl Nelson and Von Kincaid. The cattle were
fed chopped hay and were fed during the winter. When it
came time to move them to Wyoming, the cattle had made
gain and thereby J. R. Broadbent has been enriched.
If J. R. Broadbent is not liable either as joint tenant

or as principle he would have been unjustly enriched.
At 66 C.J. page 32, 2nd column, 3rd paragraph it is as
follows:
"Unjust enrichment. A phrase much used by Prof.
James Barr Ames to designate a principle which
lies at the foundation of the great bulk of quasicontracts - that one shall not unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another."
At 91 C.J.S. page 490, 2nd column, 3rd paragraph we
quote:
"Unjust enrichment. A doctrine or principle which
is that one shall not be allowed to profit or enrich
himself at the expense of another contrary to equity.
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be
specific legal principle or situa.
tion which eqmty has established or recognized t0
bring a case within the scope of the doctrine."
Under note 21 is annotated the Utah Case of Baugh t'.

Darley, 184 P. 2d 335, 112 Utah 1, and on page 337 of the
Pacific we quote from bottom of first paragraph:
"(3) Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he
has and retains money or benefits which in justice
and equity belong to another. Hummel v. Hummel
133 Ohio St. 520, 14 N.E.2d 923, 927; Federal Cor'.
poration v. Radtke, 229 Wis., 231, 281, N.W. 921.
923; Richland County Bank v. Joint School District
No. 2 of Boaz, 213 Wis. 178, 250 N.W. 407. The
benefit may be an interest in money, land, chattels,
or choses in action; beneficial services conferred;
satisfaction of a debt or duty owned by him; or any·
thing which adds to his security or advantage.
American Law Institute Restatement of Restitu·
tion, Sec. 1, comment b."
ANSWERING DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT
We have cited authorites in this Brief setting out joint
adventure and the law pertaining to third persons dealing
with joint adventurers, but without this distinction we are
going to apply the facts in the instant case to the elements
set out in the case of Mukasry v. Aaron, 20 U.2nd 383, 438
P.2nd, 702:
"l. An agreement, express or implied, among the

members of the group."

We submit there was an agreement between J. R
Broadbent and Earl Fredrickson.
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"2. A common purpose to be carried out by the
group."
The common purpose was to make a profit by putting
gain on the cattle.
"3. A community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among rtJhe members."
Each intended to make a prof.it ourt of the cattle feeding
operation.
"4. An equal right to a voice in the direction of
the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control."
We submit that both J. R. Broadbent and Earl Fredrickson had equal rights to a voice in how the cattle were
to be fed, what they were to be fed. They were both interested in the final result of putting gain on the cattle, during the winter.
We submit there was a joint adventure as to third
parties dealing with J. R. Broadbent and Earl Fredrickson.
Defendant cites the case of Robinson Transport Comvs. Hawkeye Security Insurance Company, (Wyoming,
1963) 385, P.2d 203. In that case they hold there was no
sharing of the profit. We submit that in the instant case
there was the intent of sharing the gain made on the cattle
between J. R. Broadbent and Earl Fredrickson, and that
said case is not in point with the facts in the instant case,
and clearly distinguishahle ur1011 the factual situation.

pany

